Terrorism hazard and infrastructure projects: The moderating role of home experience and institutions by Jiménez, Alfredo & Lupton, Nathaniel C.
San Jose State University 
SJSU ScholarWorks 
Faculty Research, Scholarly, and Creative Activity 
7-16-2021 
Terrorism hazard and infrastructure projects: The moderating role 
of home experience and institutions 
Alfredo Jiménez 
Kedge Business School 
Nathaniel C. Lupton 
San Jose State University, nathaniel.lupton@sjsu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/faculty_rsca 
 Part of the Infrastructure Commons, International Business Commons, and the Terrorism Studies 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alfredo Jiménez and Nathaniel C. Lupton. "Terrorism hazard and infrastructure projects: The moderating 
role of home experience and institutions" Journal of Business Research (2021): 721-730. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.jbusres.2021.07.012 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Faculty Research, Scholarly, and Creative Activity by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more 
information, please contact scholarworks@sjsu.edu. 
Journal of Business Research 135 (2021) 721–730
Available online 16 July 2021
0148-2963/Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Terrorism hazard and infrastructure projects: The moderating role of home 
experience and institutions 
Alfredo Jiménez a, Nathaniel C. Lupton b,* 
a KEDGE Business School, 680 Cours de la Libération, 33405 Talence, France 
b Lucas College of Business, San Jose State University, 1 Washington Sq., San Jose, CA 95192, USA   





Voice and accountability 
Uncertainty 
A B S T R A C T   
This paper analyzes the impact of terrorism hazard on the performance of private participation infrastructure 
projects. Applying transaction cost theory, we hypothesize that terrorism hazard has a negative relationship with 
infrastructure project completion, and that host government accountability and investor experience with 
terrorism hazard have opposing impacts on this relationship. Host government accountability, we argue, pro-
duces higher indirect costs of managing terrorism hazard, which reduces investor confidence, and reinforces the 
negative relationship between terrorism hazard and the probability of satisfactory project completion. 
Conversely, investor’s experience with terrorism hazard increases investor confidence and hence partially mit-
igates the negative consequences of terrorism hazard which hamper project completion. Hence, the impact of 
terrorism is weakened for projects led by firms from higher terrorism hazard countries. We find support for our 
hypotheses using a sample of 5,083 projects in 135 countries from 2002 to 2017.   
1. Introduction 
Acts of terrorism pose significant threats to people and their property 
all over the world (Czinkota, Knight, Liesch, & Steen, 2010). These acts 
of violence and destruction, while rare, are highly unpredictable, ever- 
present threats in developing and developed countries alike (Dau, 
Moore, & Abrahms, 2018; Henisz, Mansfield, & Glinow, 2010). Gov-
ernment responses to terrorism, in the form of deterrence and enhanced 
security measures, create additional burdens on the citizens, interna-
tional travelers, distribution channels, and institutions of countries that 
have experienced terrorist activities (Abadie & Dermisi, 2008; Chasdi, 
2017a). Terrorism has substantially impacted both business interests 
and decisions in Latin America, Western Europe, the Middle East, and 
North Africa, especially since the 1970s (Newcomer & Adkins, 1980). 
Following high-profile events, like the attacks on the World Trade 
Center in New York, the impacts of terrorism have become an apparent 
fact of life in North America as well. Attacks on infrastructure, in 
particular, are a major concern of the state, necessitating both private 
and government intervention (Lian & Haimes, 2006; Stewart, 2010). 
International business scholars have taken an increasing interest in 
the impact of violent conflict on the level of investment and performance 
of multinational firms (Driffield, Jones, & Crotty, 2013; Li & Vashchilko, 
2010; Oetzel & Getz, 2012; Oh & Oetzel, 2011, 2017). Terrorism hazard, 
in particular, increases business insolvency in both developing and 
fragile states, alike (Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2017; Tingbani, Okafor, 
Tauringana, & Zalata, 2019). Terrorism also produces non-intuitive 
business behaviors, such as increasing acts of corporate social re-
sponsibility (Abrahms, Dau, & Moore, 2019) and shunning investment 
in urban centers, even in cities that have not experienced a major 
terrorist attack (Abadie & Dermisi, 2008). Researchers of public policy 
and the built environment have long sought to identify successful stra-
tegies for assessing risk and mitigating the occurrence and destructive 
outcomes of terrorist attacks (Greenbaum, Dugan, & Lafree, 2007; 
Matsika, O’Neill, Battista, Khosravi, Laporte, & Munoz, 2016; Thöns & 
Stewart, 2020). Critical infrastructure is identified as both a primary 
target of terrorist attacks, through which the effects of the attack are felt 
widely by the populace, as well as a potential tool to be used in terrorist 
attacks, as was the case in the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2011 
(Clarke, 2004; Zoli, Steinberg, Grabowski, & Hermann, 2018). Critical 
infrastructure is also essential to a wide range of business operations, 
from transporting goods and people to conducting financial transactions 
electronically. Motivated by prior research in international business, 
public policy and the built environment, we thus turn our attention to 
the impact of terrorism hazard on private investment in infrastructure 
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projects in developing countries. The goal of this paper is to assess the 
extent to which terrorism impacts investments abroad, in the context of 
complex, private participation infrastructure (PPI) projects. In doing so, 
we aim to provide new insights into how terrorism hazard impacts in-
ternational business decisions, in the context of partnering for PPI 
project construction (Liu & Li, 2020). 
PPI projects are infrastructure developments in which all or a portion 
of the capital is provided by private investors. Traditionally, PPI projects 
have been limited by national security concerns and consequent 
perceived erosion of sovereignty (Henisz, Zelner, & Guillén, 2005). 
However, as governments of developing economies increasingly recog-
nize the critical role of infrastructure in economic development, and 
often find it difficult to raise capital through fiscal policy, they seek to 
accelerate development through the inclusion of private capital and 
ownership (Jiang, Peng, Yang, & Mutlu, 2015; Ramamurti & Doh, 
2004). As a result, the volume of capital contributed to these projects has 
increased tenfold between 1994 and 2013, from $41.3 billion to $415.0 
billion, and is forecasted to reach more than $90 trillion in the period 
2015–2030 (Bielenberg, Kerlin, Oppenheim, & Roberts, 2016; Dor-
obantu, Lindner, & Müllner, 2020; Esty, 1999). 
PPIs are a concession-oriented type of public–private partnership (i. 
e. the private sector is involved and operates as a contractor) (Hodge & 
Greve, 2007; Klijn, Edelenbos, Kort, & Van Twist, 2008) in which a 
financially and organizationally independent entity is created tempo-
rarily by a consortium of companies, called sponsors, who collaborate 
closely to ensure the successful execution and completion of the project 
(Eriksson, Larsson, & Pesämaa, 2017). Designed as stand-alone project 
companies with no previous history or assets, these entities are typically 
funded through non-recourse loans which are secured only by the future 
cash flows generated by the infrastructure (Dorobantu et al., 2020). The 
ability of sponsors to tolerate various transaction costs has a critical role 
on the actual cost and viability of the projects. Despite being temporary, 
these projects may last years or decades, especially when the infra-
structure is yet to be built. Given their cost, duration, and their strategic 
and long-lasting impact on the countrýs development, private partici-
pation infrastructure projects are often politically important though at 
times also controversial (Eriksson et al., 2017). 
Governments that are more accountable to their citizens are typically 
more responsive to the threats posed by terrorism, and the policies 
implemented by the state tend to disrupt the orderly movement of 
people and materials within an infrastructure system (Spich & Grosse, 
2005). We therefore predict that government accountability in the PPI 
host country strengthens the negative relationship between terrorism 
hazard and project success, as more responsive governments are likely to 
mitigate the perceptual hazards of terrorism through heightened secu-
rity measures. We also examine the potential mitigating effect of in-
vestors’ experience with terrorism hazard in their home country. We 
thus address the following research questions: (1) to what extent does 
terrorism hazard impact project completion? and, (2) to what extent is 
the hazard posed by terrorism on project completion influenced by the 
level of voice and accountability of the host country and experience with 
terrorism hazard in the investors’ home country? 
Applying transaction cost theory (TCT: Henisz et al., 2010; Wil-
liamson, 1981), we argue that terrorism hazard is negatively associated 
with the performance of private participation projects because terrorism 
produces both direct and indirect consequences that increase the risk of 
cost overruns. One of the key insight of TCT is that organizational actors 
choose the most efficient structure for transactions, depending on their 
relative degree of uncertainty, frequency and, especially, asset speci-
ficity (Williamson, 1985). Given that PPIs are idiosyncratic to the needs 
of the country that has opened them to private bidding, and that the 
organization for fulfilling these contracts is temporary in nature, their 
organizational structure can be conceptualized as a nexus of asset- 
specific, incomplete contracts between government, transnational or-
ganizations (e.g. the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, etc.), 
and private construction enterprises. Similar to the manner in which 
cultural and linguistic differences between contracting partners increase 
uncertainty and information asymmetries, thereby impacting organi-
zational performance, (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2001; Cuypers, Gokhan, 
& Hennart, 2015), we argue that terrorism hazard increases transaction 
costs within this nexus of contracts. 
We also examine two mitigating factors impacting the degree to 
which terrorism hazard impacts project success. We argue for a 
strengthening of the negative relationship when accountability of the 
host country government is higher, as accountability leads to higher 
transaction costs for PPI via enhanced supply chain security measures 
(Spich & Grosse, 2005). Also, based on the finding that firm-specific 
assets can reduce transaction costs, (Buckley, 1988; Buckley, Chen, 
Clegg, & Voss, 2018; Feinberg & Gupta, 2009), we predict that when 
investors have more experience dealing with terrorism hazard, they are 
less averse to the risks it poses and more effective in dealing with them, 
which increases the firms’ commitment to the project and hence the 
likelihood of its successful completion. This prediction is aligned with 
extensions to TCT which show that psychological framing of risks im-
pacts aversion to exchange in incomplete contracts, thus raising trans-
action costs (Weber, Mayer, & Macher, 2011). 
To answer our research questions, we analyze a sample of 5,083 
projects in 135 developing economy countries from 2002 to 2017 and 
find robust empirical support to validate our hypotheses. In responding 
to these research questions, our paper makes the following contribu-
tions. First, we contribute to the body of literature devoted to private 
participation projects (Doh & Ramamurti, 2003; Jiménez, Jiang, 
Petersen, & Gammelgaard, 2019; Ramamurti & Doh, 2004) by showing 
empirical evidence that terrorism hazard has a negative, relationship 
with the likelihood of PPI project completion. We also find that projects 
undertaken in countries with more responsive governments (those with 
stronger voice and accountability) tend to face increased hazard, sug-
gesting that government response to terrorism may unintentionally 
impede infrastructure development. Finally, we find that experiential 
learning (Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013; Getz & Oetzel, 2009) from home 
country terrorism levels is partially transferrable to projects in countries 
where terrorism poses a similar threat. 
Our study also contributes to existing transaction cost analyses of 
exchange contexts comprised of a mixture of market and non-market 
transactions (Buckley & Boddewyn, 2015). Evidence from prior 
research on investment location choice suggests that the costs related to 
terrorism do not deter MNE investment (Oh & Oetzel, 2017). We argue 
that this is because the costs are not easily estimated a priori, whereas in 
the case of PPI these costs are gradually realized as projects proceed 
through the building and operating phases. Hence, the probability of 
successfully completing projects undertaken in countries with higher 
terrorist activity will be reduced due to higher than expected costs and 
increased investor anxiety. 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
2.1. Terrorism hazard and infrastructure development project completion 
Transaction cost theory (TCT) provides a valuable lens through 
which to examine the impact of various types of hazards on investment 
by profit-seeking organizations (Henisz, 2002; Williamson, 1981). 
Transaction costs, comprised of contract negotiation, monitoring, and 
enforcement costs, are incurred when searching for, engaging with, and 
monitoring customer and supplier relationships (Hennart, 1991). These 
costs exist due to the behavioral assumptions of bounded rationality, 
opportunism, and bounded reliability, where organizational perfor-
mance is dependent upon properly aligning governance mechanisms 
with the characteristics of the transaction (Williamson, 1981). For 
multinational business, transaction costs vary from country to country 
depending on the qualities of property rights, macro-economic policy, 
and cultural differences (Cuypers et al., 2015; Cuypers, 2021). TCT, 
originally applied to the “make vs. buy” decision, is also fruitfully 
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applied to the study of organizational forms that are prevalent in PPI, 
including strategic alliances, supply chains, and public–private part-
nerships (Cuypers, 2021). PPIs, being large-scale construction projects, 
designed to idiosyncratic specifications (i.e. possessing asset- 
specificity), involve several entities such as contractors, suppliers of 
material, equipment, engineering services, and so forth. This diverse 
network of actors, while working together over a period spanning many 
years and even decades, are nonetheless temporary in nature, such that 
governance mechanisms are inevitably a mix of market and hierarchy. 
The cost of conducting these transactions tends to increase in the pres-
ence of uncertainty, incomplete information, and specificity of the 
product or service created (Ramamurti & Doh, 2004; Williamson, 1985). 
Terrorism hazard adds an additional element of uncertainty, and is 
costly to mitigate (Chasdi, 2017b; Czinkota et al., 2010). 
Terrorist activity is intermittent, isolated, and driven by ideology, 
and usually targets non-combatants (Wernick, 2006). The frequency and 
severity of prior terrorist incidents are therefore imprecise predictors of 
future incidents. Building on TCT logic, and the current empirical evi-
dence, terrorism hazard is likely to increase transaction costs, as an 
unavoidable consequence of regulatory responses (Chasdi, 2017a; 
Czinkota et al., 2010). In this study, we focus on the extent to which 
terrorism hazard impacts the performance of private participation pro-
jects, dependent upon not only the absolute hazard posed by terrorism in 
the host country, but also the hazard relative to that of the investors’ 
home country. Performance, in this case, is not related to the profit-
ability or subsequent survival of a venture, but to the successful 
completion of the project, which can be threatened when investors 
choose to withdraw their support in the face of changing risk and/or 
their tolerance for it. Hence, given the boundaries for rational decision- 
making specific to PPI investment (i.e. the inability of multinational 
investors to select an ideal location for a specific project, and to infer 
future terrorist events from prior events), the costs of the project cannot 
be accurately predicted prior to investment, and tend to reveal them-
selves gradually through supply chain inefficiencies and added security 
costs. 
Terrorism has both direct and indirect impacts on firms (Tingbani 
et al., 2019). The direct effects, including loss of life and property 
damage, are felt acutely at the site of an attack and these attacks can also 
have lasting impacts on the systems and psyche of the societies in which 
they occur (Chasdi, 2017a). Despite being intermittent and relatively 
rare, the profound and lasting impact of terrorism motivates firms to 
take actions and incur additional expenses to prevent or minimize the 
direct effects of a terrorist attack. These indirect effects of terrorism are 
the primary impacts of terrorism on the daily operations of firms 
(Czinkota, Knight, & Liesch, 2004). Costs are derived from the in-
vestments in enhanced security, contract monitoring, and negotiation, 
information asymmetry arising from the myriad government policies 
designed to reduce the risks of terrorist attacks on the built environment, 
and supply chain inefficiencies resulting from added oversight and 
reduced mobility of resources, especially across borders (Czinkota et al., 
2010; Lian & Haimes, 2006; Matsika et al., 2016). 
Building resiliency into a system is costly (O’Rourke, 2007; Stewart, 
2010), as are construction methods used to maintain the structural 
integrity of buildings in the presence of damaging forces. Heightened 
security and increased insurance premiums impede the flow of both 
people and materials, in turn reducing transaction efficiency (Powers & 
Choi, 2012). Like the enhanced screening procedures of the Trans-
portation Safety Administration introduced following terrorist attacks in 
the US, which had a negative impact on air travel in the days following 
the 9/11 attacks and can still be felt to a lesser extent today, new in-
efficiencies and costs are created by incremental changes to existing, 
complex systems (Spich & Grosse, 2005). Both the enhanced security 
and the improvements made to increase the flow of traffic are costly, and 
these costs are borne by travelers, airlines, airports, and/or govern-
ments. These costs also reduce the mobility of financial assets and the 
materials required in abundance for infrastructure projects, especially 
when crossing borders. 
PPI projects are thus an ideal empirical setting for testing the impact 
of terrorism hazard on organizational performance. Given that in-
vestors’ interests are secyred by future cash flows, the financing of these 
projects is very sensitive to host country hazard characteristics (Esty, 
1999; Esty & Megginson, 2003; Hainz & Kleimeier, 2012; Byoun & Xu, 
2014; Müllner, 2017; Dorobantu & Müllner, 2019). PPIs are usually very 
large investments and require the deployment of many physical assets 
that are subject to the potentially damaging effects of terrorist attacks. 
Likewise, foreign ownership of these projects creates a particularly 
salient symbol of colonialism making them salient targets for left-wing 
terrorism (Chasdi, 2017a). Finally, infrastructure projects tend to be 
idiosyncratic with respect to their design and hence heterogeneous with 
respect to the types and quantities of materials and knowledge required 
to complete them successfully. Hence, the effects of supply chain 
disruption, created by changes in importation and transportation pol-
icies in response to terrorism threats, are likely to have a particularly 
acute impact. 
Based on the transaction cost consequences of terrorism hazard 
described above, we therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Host country terrorism hazard is negatively associated with the 
probability of completion of a private participation project. 
2.2. Government accountability and terrorism hazard 
In addition to altering the relevance of firm-specific assets, differ-
ences in the governance environment from country to country can also 
influence the magnitude of transaction costs (Chi, 2015; Hennart, 2009). 
Terrorism creates an environment in which conducting transactions is 
less efficient, due to government interventions aimed at enhancing se-
curity and thwarting attacks (Czinkota et al., 2004; Spich & Grosse, 
2005). Countries with stronger accountability to their citizens typically 
respond more quickly and forcefully to crises, implementing disaster- 
mitigating policies that disrupt the movement of people, money and 
materials within an orderly supply chain (Spich & Grosse, 2005). Gov-
ernments that are more accountable are also more responsive to the 
demands of important stakeholders, and their commitments are 
considered more credible (Delios & Henisz, 2003). Research has 
consistently shown that MNEs are more likely to choose locations in 
which governments have demonstrated accountability (Daude & Stein, 
2007) and consequently foreign subsidiaries tend to survive longer in 
these locations. However, we argue that accountability also has a 
downside for conducting transactions efficiently in the context of 
terrorism hazard. 
The ability of citizens to express their concerns about the effective 
control and prevention of terrorist activity, along with the expectation 
that national governments will act within the best interests of the citi-
zens, is a crucial feedback mechanism for the implementation of policies 
and practices aimed at curbing terrorist violence. In countries where 
accountability is higher, disasters tend to result in fewer deaths and 
shorter disruptions (Gassebner, Keck, & Teh, 2010). Overt displays of 
heightened security, such as the presence of heavily armed police in the 
transportation network of New York city in the years following the at-
tacks on the World Trade Center, are intended to both deter would-be 
attackers and instill confidence among the multitude of travelers who 
contribute to the local economy (Spich & Grosse, 2005). All of these 
responses add extra bureaucratic obstacles to the flow of goods and 
people, creating additional costs which are gradually revealed during 
the execution phase of large infrastructure projects. 
In summary, a country’s accountability increases its government’s 
motivation to respond to terrorist threats, thereby improving public 
trust. The associated costs of reassuring the public can, in turn, aggra-
vate the relationship between terrorism hazard and the completion of 
PPI projects. 
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H2: The negative relationship between a country’s terrorism hazard and 
the probability of completion of a private participation project in that 
country is stronger in host countries with higher levels of voice and 
accountability. 
2.3. Transferability of terrorism hazard experience 
TCT posits that firms engage in investments abroad where con-
ducting arms-length (i.e. market-based) transactions in intermediate 
product markets is more expensive (Buckley & Casson, 1976). Following 
extensions to the original TCT (Hennart, 2009; Rugman, 1981) we 
consider the impact of the interaction between location characteristics 
and firm-specific assets driving ownership structure, strategy and, ulti-
mately, performance. Following research in international business, in 
particular, (Li & Vashchilko, 2010; Oetzel & Getz, 2012; Oh & Oetzel, 
2017), we argue that experience with terrorism hazard in the investor’s 
home country mitigates the negative impact of terrorism hazard in the 
host country on project completion. That is, experience working within a 
supply chain and institutional system impacted by policy response to 
terrorism (i.e. enhanced screening of people, financial and material as-
sets, added security, disclosure, and information gathering re-
quirements) is a firm-specific asset that is transferrable to locations with 
similar hazard profiles. 
TCT also stresses the contextual relevance of firm-specific assets for 
reducing transaction costs, with an emphasis on moderating influences 
of location characteristics (Erramilli, Agarwal, & Kim, 1997; Hennart, 
2009; Rugman, 1981). That is, the extent to which a firm-specific asset is 
fungible depends on its relevance and strength compared with host 
country domestic competition. Therefore, while terrorism hazard is ex-
pected to add costs to most projects, we argue that these costs will 
transfer at different rates amongst projects. Investors from countries 
with high levels of terrorism hazard likely have experience dealing with 
heightened security measures and policies that impact the efficiency of 
supply chains, distribution channels, and overall cost of construction 
(Driffield et al., 2013). 
Prior research has found that a firm’s country-specific experience 
managing subsidiaries in violence-prone regions decreases the impact of 
violence on subsequent investments, but that this experience may not 
always be transferrable to other countries. Other things being equal, 
firms will tend to avoid high-conflict regions, and experience operating 
in a country with high conflict neither improves nor reduces the odds of 
investing in another high-conflict country (Oh & Oetzel, 2017). While 
this suggests that foreign investors may not perceive their experience 
with conflict as an asset to be exploited, it does not necessarily mean that 
it cannot provide a benefit after an investment in a similarly high-risk 
context is made. Furthermore, given the location-bound nature of PPI, 
investors have substantially fewer options when choosing locations and 
hence must be more involved in managing hazards where an opportu-
nity arises (Jiang et al., 2015). Finally, terrorism is sporadic, and its 
effects are more commonly felt by business indirectly (Abadie & Der-
misi, 2008). These effects can create an “imprinting” effect on business 
organizations, which impacts how firms react to future opportunities 
and hazards in different institutional environments (Konara & Shir-
odkar, 2018; Stinchcombe, 1965). Therefore, we argue not only that the 
costs arising from heightened terrorism hazard (insurance, using dis-
tribution channels, security, etc.) can be better anticipated by more 
experienced investors, but also that experience with heightened 
terrorism hazard reduces investors’ anxiety. Hence, experienced in-
vestors will tend to exhibit more patience in the face of increased 
terrorism hazard, leading to a higher probability that they will remain 
committed to the project through completion. 
Hence, we predict that projects funded by investors from countries 
with higher terrorism hazard will be more likely to succeed. 
H3: The relationship between a host country’s terrorism hazard and the 
probability of completion of a private participation project in that country 
is weaker when the level of terrorism hazard of the investor’s home 
country is high. 
3. Method 
3.1. Sample 
Our sample consists of private participation projects from the World 
Banḱs Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Project Database, a 
source commonly used in the literature (Fleta-Asin, Munoz, & Rosell- 
Martinez, 2019; Jiang et al., 2015; Jiménez, Salvaj, & Lee, 2018; 
Wang, Liu, Xiong, & Zhu, 2019). It is comprised of 5,875 private 
participation projects, of which the main sponsor is a foreign investor, 
between 2002 and 2013, in 135 developing economy countries for 
which data on terrorism hazard is available. Accounting for missing data 
on variables of interest, our final sample size is 5,083. Host countries 
included in the sample are shown in Table 1. 
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Dependent variable 
A PPI project is deemed complete when its investors fulfill the 
capitalization requirements, develop the facility, and provide the ser-
vices outlined in a legally-binding contract (Jiang et al., 2015). When 
the concession period is terminated prematurely by either the govern-
ment or other sponsors, then the project is deemed to be incomplete. 
The World Bank’s PPI Project Database contains five categories of 
Table 1 
Host countries included in sample of PPI projects.  
Afghanistan Côte d’Ivoire Lebanon Senegal 
Albania Djibouti Lesotho Seychelles 
Algeria Dominica Liberia Sierra Leone 





Angola Ecuador Madagascar Somalia 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Malawi South Africa 
Argentina El Salvador Malaysia South Sudan 
Armenia Eritrea Maldives Sri Lanka 
Azerbaijan Ethiopia Mali St. Lucia 
Bangladesh Fiji Mauritania St. Vincent and 
Grenadines 
Belarus Gabon Mauritius Sudan 
Belize Gambia, The Mexico Suriname 
Benin Georgia Moldova Swaziland 
Bhutan Ghana Mongolia Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Bolivia Grenada Montenegro Tajikistan 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Guatemala Morocco Tanzania 
Botswana Guinea Mozambique Thailand 
Brazil Guinea-Bissau Myanmar Timor-Leste 
Bulgaria Guyana, CR Namibia Togo 
Burkina Faso Haiti Nepal Tonga 
Burundi Honduras Nicaragua Tunisia 
Cambodia India Niger Turkey 
Cameroon Indonesia Nigeria Turkmenistan 
Cape Verde Iran, Islamic Rep. Pakistan Uganda 
Central African 
Republic 
Iraq Panama Ukraine 
Chad Jamaica Papua New 
Guinea 
Uzbekistan 
China Jordan Paraguay Vanuatu 
Colombia Kazakhstan Peru Venezuela, RB 
Comoros Kenya Philippines Vietnam 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Korea, Dem. 
People’s Rep 
Romania West Bank and Gaza 
Congo, Rep. Kosovo Russian 
Federation 
Yemen, Rep. 
Costa Rica Kyrgyz Republic Rwanda Zambia 
Cuba Lao PDR Samoa Zimbabwe  
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project status. Among these statuses are “operational”, when the project 
is in service; “merged”, when the project has been combined with 
another active project; and “concluded”, when the contract period has 
expired. Each of these three statuses is considered complete, as each 
indicates that the project is either functional, concluded, or actively 
working towards the expected outcome. A project status of “cancelled” 
or “distressed” indicates that the project has either been abandoned or is 
in arbitration. The private sector investor(s) may have exited the project 
in any of the following ways: selling or transferring the economic in-
terest back to the government before fulfilling the contract terms; 
removing all personnel from the project; or ceasing operation, service 
provision, or construction for 15 percent or more of the license or 
concession period, following the revocation of the license or repudiation 
of the contract. We thus consider either of these two statuses as failures, 
and code a binary variable accordingly (1 = completed). 
3.2.2. Independent variable 
To measure host and home countries’ terrorism hazard, we use the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD, 2017), which has been previously 
used in the literature (Tingbani et al., 2019). Terrorism hazard is 
measured by the number of terrorist incidents within a country. 
Terrorist incidents include threat and violence, with social, religious, 
political, and economic motives (Greenbaum et al., 2007). We lagged all 
the explanatory variables included in the model (independent, moder-
ators, and controls) by one year. 
3.2.3. Moderating variables 
We propose in Hypothesis 2 that the relationship between terrorism 
hazard in the host country and private participation projects will be 
moderated by the level of voice and accountability in the host country. 
We obtain this variable from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
database (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2006; Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2008). Next, we propose in Hypothesis 3 that the relationship 
between terrorism hazard in the host country and private participation 
projects will be moderated by the level of terrorism hazard in the home 
country. We again use the GTD to obtain data on the level of terrorism 
hazard in the home countries of the main investor of the project, i.e. the 
one holding the largest share of ownership. 
3.2.4. Control variables 
Our models include country fixed effects, to account for potential 
unobserved heterogeneity between the 135 host countries in our sample. 
We also include project-level control variables in the model that could 
have a potential impact on project performance. First, we include the 
age of the project, and the delay between the project closure and the 
project commitment. We also include dummy variables to control for 
projects that include the host government as a sponsor, and for those 
that are greenfield investments. Finally, we include dummy variables for 
the sectors identified in the PPI dataset (energy, telecommunications, 
water sewerage, and transport). Telecommunications is used as the 
reference category, so a variable was not generated for this sector. To 
control for unobserved country-level effects, we include country in-
dicators (i.e. dummy variables). Table 2 provides the definition and 
operationalization of the variables included in the model 
3.3. Model estimation 
To study the impact of terrorism hazard on the performance of pri-
vate participation projects we use binary logistic regression models. 
Regarding the moderation hypotheses, Haans, Pieters, and He (2016) 
have recently demonstrated that mean-centering the interacted vari-
ables is not necessary. However, mean-centering and standardizing 
improve interpretability of the coefficients and plotting interactions 
(Osborne, 2015) Hence we report in the main models the results when 
continuous variables all mean-centered. 
4. Results 
We report the descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables 
in the model in Table 3. All correlation coefficients are not high, and all 
individual VIFs are lower than 10 as advised by (Studenmund & Cassidy, 
1992), except that related to voice. Yet, collinearity does not seem to be 
a serious concern as the correlation coefficients of voice with all other 
variables are very low (<0.3). Besides, following Kalnins (2018), we 
checked that the signs and magnitudes of the rest of the variables in the 
models are consistent when voice is excluded. Finally, as noted by 
Lindner, Puck, and Verbeke (2019) “… multicollinearity in a regression 
model is likely to do no worse than inflate standard errors which, 
although not optimal, will do no more than making results more con-
servative” (p. 9) as it does not bias the coefficient estimates. 
We present the results of sequential logistic regression analyses hi-
erarchically in Table 4. Model 1 is the base model including only the 
control variables. Model 2 adds the level of terrorism hazard in the host 
country to test Hypothesis 1. Model 3 includes the level of voice and 
accountability of the host country and its interaction with the level of 
host country terrorism hazard to test Hypothesis 2. Model 4 includes the 
home country’s level of terrorism hazard and its interaction with the 
level of host country terrorism hazard to test Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a negative relationship between terrorism 
hazard of the country in which a PPI project is located and project 
completion. The rationale was that lower levels of terrorism hazard 
would have minimal impact on project completion, but higher levels of 
hazards would begin to substantially impact policies that would reduce 
factor mobility, in turn reducing the efficiency of the supply chain. The 
results show that the coefficient terrorism hazard in the host country is 
negative and significant (β = -0.825, p < 0.001, s.e. = 0.228). Since 
logistic regression produces a non-linear estimate of the relationship 
between terrorism hazard and the probability of PPI project success (i.e. 
by estimating the linear relationship between the log of the odds ratio of 
success and the independent variable; in this case, terrorism hazard), we 
provide the plot depicted in Fig. 1. 
Table 2 
Description of key variables.  
Variable name Description 
Completion 1 if project status is “operational”, “merged”, 
or “concluded”, 0 if project status is 
“cancelled” or “distressed” (PPI Project 
Database) 
Sector (energy, telecommunications, 
transport, water sewerage) 
Set of four dummy variables representing 
sectors. 1 if project is in the sector, 0 otherwise 
(PPI Project Database) 
Total investment Log of the total amount of investment in the 
project (PPI Project Database) 
Age Time lapse between the year in which the 
project took place and nowadays (PPI Project 
Database) 
Delay Delay between project closure and the project 
commitment (PPI Project Database) 
Greenfield 1 if project is greenfield, 0 otherwise (PPI 
Project Database) 
Host government ownership 1 if project consortium includes the host 
government as an owner, 0 otherwise (PPI 
Project Database) 
Host terrorism hazard Number of terrorist incidents within the host 
country in the previous year (Global Terrorism 
Database) 
Voice and accountability Index of perceptions of the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom 
of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media (Worldwide Governance 
Indicators) 
Home terrorism hazard Number of terrorist incidents within the home 
country in the previous year (Global Terrorism 
Database)  
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Logit regression result.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 







































































































hazard * Voice 






hazard * Home 
terrorism 
hazard (H3)    
0.285* 
(0.144) 








Log likelihood − 523.75 − 559.61 − 549.71 − 547.32 
Pseudo R2 0.249 0.263 0.269 0.272 
Observations 5,110 5,110 5,083 5,083 
Notes: Country indicators included in all models. Base category for sector is ICT. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
Fig. 1. Probability of project success and terrorism hazard. Notes: Terrorism 
hazard is normalized (unit = 1 standard deviation), bands represent 95% 
confidence intervals for predicted values of probability of success. 
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Model 3 includes the interaction between the host country’s level of 
terrorism hazard and the level of voice and accountability. Hypothesis 2 
proposes that the negative relationship between terrorism hazard in the 
host country and project performance will be strengthened when the 
level of voice and accountability in the host country is higher. The 
interaction term between terrorism hazard in the host country and the 
level of voice and accountability is negative and statistically significant 
(β = -1.389, p < 0.01, s.e. = 0.401). Given the logistic nature of the 
relationship we study, we rely on graphical analysis to depict the 
moderating relationship (Ai & Norton, 2003; Boellis, Mariotti, Mini-
chilli, & Piscitello, 2016). The plot of the predicted relationship, for 
values of voice and accountability 1.5 standard deviations above and 
below the mean, is depicted in Fig. 2, showing a strengthening effect on 
the negative relationship between host terrorism hazard and project 
completion, at higher levels of voice and accountability. The 95% con-
fidence intervals for the predicted marginal effects are not overlapping 
for values of host country terrorism hazard two or more standard de-
viations above the mean. This result suggests that higher levels of voice 
and accountability in the host country attenuate the inverted effect of 
terrorism hazard in the host country on project performance, thus sup-
porting Hypothesis 2. 
Model 4 adds the interaction between host and home countries’ level 
of terrorism hazard. Hypothesis 3 proposes that the relationship be-
tween terrorism hazard in the host country and project performance will 
be stronger when the level of terrorism hazard in the home country is 
higher. The interaction term between terrorism hazard in the host 
country and in the home country is positive and statistically significant 
(β = 0.285, p = 0.05, s.e. = 144). Fig. 3 plots the relationship between 
host country terrorism hazard and the probability of project success for 
values of home country terrorism hazard one standard deviation below, 
and four standard deviations above, the mean. Where the 95% confi-
dence intervals for estimates of the margin effects are not overlapping, 
the nature of the interaction is a weakening effect on the negative 
relationship between host terrorism hazard and project completion, at 
higher levels of main sponsor home country terrorism hazard. This result 
suggests that higher terrorism hazard in the home country of private 
investors attenuates the effect of terrorism hazard in the host country on 
project performance, thus supporting Hypothesis 3. 
5. Discussion 
In this study we analyzed the relationship between terrorism hazard 
and the likelihood of completion of private participation projects in 
emerging countries. Drawing on a sample of 5,083 projects in 109 
countries from 2002 to 2017, we argued and found statistically 
significant evidence of a negative relationship between terrorism hazard 
and private participation projects’ completion. Building on transaction 
cost theory (Williamson, 1985), we hypothesized that higher terrorism 
hazard would increase transaction costs, and therefore decrease the 
probability of project success (Abadie & Dermisi, 2008; Branzei & 
Abdelnour, 2010; Chasdi, 2017a; Henisz et al., 2010). We also found 
that higher host government accountability aggravated the impact of 
terrorism hazard on the completion of these projects. Finally, investors’ 
prior experience with terrorism hazard at home, as predicted, appears to 
weaken the relationship between terrorism hazard level in the host 
country, and the probability of PPI project completion, supporting our 
argument that, within this context, experience with terrorism hazard is 
transferrable. 
This paper contributes to the growing literature on PPI projects 
(Jiménez et al., 2019; Jiménez et al., 2018; Li, Liu, Shrestha, Martek, & 
Zhang, 2018) as an extension to the more commonly studied 
manufacturing and commercial organizations. Following others (e.g. 
Buckley & Boddewyn, 2015), we extend TCT to non-market transactions 
involved in building and managing PPI projects in host locations. The 
two main premises of TCT, derived from rational action modeling 
(Buckley & Casson, 1998), are that firms select the lowest (expected) 
cost location for the investment, and that they own and manage assets, 
rather than contracting for services, to the extent that the added costs of 
further growth exceed the benefits. We likewise argue that terrorism 
hazard is associated with higher location and transaction costs. In 
accordance with the global systems perspective derived from the orig-
inal theory, which views firms and institutions as interconnected and 
mutually embedded (Buckley & Hashai, 2004), we explored some of the 
implications of an exogenous hazard and its cost implications. Given the 
unpredictability of terrorism, it is not easily factored into the needed 
return on investment for infrastructure projects and, as a result, in-
vestors are more likely to withdraw support for projects prior to 
completion when the hazard is high. 
To date, business research explaining the impact of conflict and 
terrorism has focused primarily on private investment that is aimed at 
generating new revenue streams or improving supply chain efficiency 
(Chen, 2017; Oh & Oetzel, 2011; Witte, Burger, Ianchovichina, & Pen-
nings, 2017). Research on terrorism hazard in the built environment, on 
the other hand, has focused on the impact of attacks on infrastructure 
and its occupants, as well as public policy formulation to mitigate these 
impacts (Clarke, 2004; Zoli et al., 2018). This study provides a trans-
action cost perspective on the growing literature on PPI projects as non- 
traditional, yet increasingly relevant, investment opportunities. Previ-
ous studies on private participation projects have examined the impact 
of project-specific characteristics, such as the method of privatization Fig. 2. Interaction of host government voice and accountability and 
terrorism hazard. 
Fig. 3. Interaction of home country terrorism hazard experience and host 
country terrorism hazard. 
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(Djankov, 1999), and state ownership (Doh, 2000; Doh, Teegen, & 
Mudambi, 2004; Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2013), on their 
completion. Others have examined the effect of country characteristics 
such as government credibility (Ramamurti, 2003), policy reforms 
(Henisz et al., 2005), and political risk/stability (Jiang et al., 2015; 
Jiménez et al., 2018). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 
to examine the impact of host country terrorism hazard on project 
completion rates. 
We also found that host country accountability weakens the impact 
of terrorism hazard on project completion, a finding which aligns with 
the notion that host country-specific characteristics can impact trans-
action costs (Buckley, 2016; Hennart, 2009). Accountability, and its 
strong association with private property rights, is a key enabler of eco-
nomic growth and also plays an important role in FDI attraction (Alesina 
& Rodrik, 1994; Henisz, 2000). In the case of PPI projects, government 
accountability is also deemed important for completing projects in a 
cost-effective manner (Wu, Liu, Jin, & Sing, 2016). However, as gov-
ernments strive to meet the needs of different stakeholder groups, the 
extreme physical and psychological threats posed by terrorism will often 
outweigh concerns for transaction efficiency. While it is not suggested 
that governments should de-emphasize threat-mitigation efforts, the 
need for a more effective and consistent approach to doing so should be 
a priority for transnational organizations, especially as the approaches 
used vary substantially between countries at present (Matsika et al., 
2016). 
Finally, through our examination of the mitigating effect of firms’ 
terrorism hazard experience on the relationship between terrorism 
hazard and project completion, we contribute to the cross-border 
applicability of non-production related management knowledge as a 
firm-specific asset that can be helpful in reducing transaction costs 
associated with increased terrorism hazard (Buckley, 2016; Rugman, 
1981). Experience operating business in the context of higher conflict 
hazard does not always transfer readily across borders, perhaps because 
the type of conflict is very idiosyncratic from one location to the next 
(Oh & Oetzel, 2011). As a result, it has been found that terrorism hazard 
experience is not a major factor when selecting investment locations (Oh 
& Oetzel, 2017). However, in the context of PPIs, we find supporting 
evidence that the impact of prior experience mitigates the negative 
relationship between terrorism hazard and project completion. The 
reason, we argue, is that this type of home country environment not only 
allows managers to learn how to deal with similar institutions in other 
countries (Holburn & Zelner, 2010), but more importantly impacts 
perceptions of investment opportunities and risks, such that their 
commitment to projects is stronger (Konara & Shirodkar, 2018). Thus, 
our findings support that experience with terrorism hazard in the home 
country leads to a higher probability of a favorable outcome, and hence 
this form of learning is at least partly transferrable to new projects and 
locations. 
Our paper also has relevant implications for managers and policy-
makers. First, in addition to highlighting the importance of terrorism 
hazard in the host country, our paper suggests managers should be 
aware that their prior exposure and familiarity with terrorism in their 
home country can influence how they perceive hazards abroad. For 
policymakers, our results emphasize the role of voice and accountability 
in mitigating terrorism hazard. Hence, increasing the perception of their 
countries as destinations where reforms are taking place to increase both 
supply chain efficiency and the level of government accountability will 
boost the performance of foreign infrastructure investments. 
5.1. Limitations and avenues for future research 
We acknowledge that our paper is subject to several limitations, 
which create avenues for future research. First, we only analyze the 
impact of our variables of interest on the likelihood of completion of 
private participation projects, but they could also affect other issues 
such as profitability or repeated investments in a specific country. 
Second, in this paper we focus on terrorism hazard, but the literature on 
major risks/hazards has identified other potential sources of uncertainty 
for investors such as technological disasters, war, and climate risks. 
Future studies can analyze how these types of risks affect private 
participation projects. Third, the year coverage in our analysis 
(2002–2017) is constrained by the data availability in the sources we 
employ, and future studies could confirm if our findings hold in other 
periods. 
Overall, we believe that our paper adds to the growing body of 
literature on privatization projects (Fleta-Asin et al., 2019; Jiang et al., 
2015; Jiménez et al., 2018; Li et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2019) and on 
major disasters (Oh & Oetzel, 2011) and addresses calls for new 
business-oriented perspectives on terrorism hazard (Czinkota et al., 
2010; Henisz et al., 2010). Yet, more efforts are needed to understand 
how major disasters affect private participation projects, and we 
encourage other scholars to continue this line of investigation to deepen 
our knowledge on this topic. 
6. Conclusion 
Through an empirical study of PPIs in emerging economies, we found 
that terrorism hazard increases the failure rate of projects. Applying a 
transaction cost lens and conducting a moderated binary logistic 
regression analysis, we found support for our prediction that, due to the 
fact that PPI projects are undertaken by a complex network of actors 
working in temporary governance arrangements, they are subject to 
transaction costs arising from incomplete contracts and the bounded 
reliability of partners. We reported evidence that these transaction costs 
associated with terrorism hazard are negatively associated with project 
completion rates, especially when the external policy environment (i.e. 
voice and accountability) favors safety, and psychological security, over 
transaction efficiency. Furthermore, firms that have experience with 
terrorism hazard at home are less prone to the psychological impact of 
terrorism hazard on project risk assessment, such that projects involving 
more experienced firms have a higher probability of success. Further 
research is needed to assess the extent to which various configurations of 
public, private, and NGO actors are beneficial when dealing with the 
heightened transaction inefficiencies posed by terrorism hazard. 
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A. Jiménez and N.C. Lupton                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Journal of Business Research 135 (2021) 721–730
730
Konara, P., & Shirodkar, V. (2018). Regulatory institutional distance and MNCs’ 
subsidiary performance: Climbing up vs. climbing down the institutional ladder. 
Journal of International Management, 24(4), 333–347. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
intman.2018.04.004. 
Li, K., Liu, G., Shrestha, A., Martek, I., & Zhang, X. (2018). The role of local private 
participation in china’s transition to domestically developed renewable energy 
technologies. Journal of Cleaner Production, 173, 217–224. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.jclepro.2017.04.125. 
Li, Q. A., & Vashchilko, T. (2010). Dyadic military conflict, security alliances, and 
bilateral FDI flows. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(5), 765–782. https:// 
doi.org/10.1057/jibs.2009.91. 
Lian, C., & Haimes, Y. Y. (2006). Managing the risk of terrorism to interdependent 
infrastructure systems through the dynamic inoperability input–output model. 
Systems Engineering, 9(3), 241–258. https://doi.org/10.1002/sys.20051. 
Lindner, T., Puck, J., & Verbeke, A. (2019). Misconceptions about multicollinearity in 
international business research: Identification, consequences, and remedies. Journal 
of International Business Studies, 51(3): 283-298 0.1057/s41267-019-00257-1. 
Liu, C., & Li, D. (2020). Divestment response to host-country terrorist attacks: Inter-firm 
influence and the role of temporal consistency. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 51(8), 1331–1346. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-020-00333-x. 
Matsika, E., O’neill, C., Battista, U., Khosravi, M., Laporte, A. D. S., & Munoz, E. (2016). 
Development of risk assessment specifications for analysing terrorist attacks 
vulnerability on metro and light rail systems. Transportation Research Procedia, 14, 
1345-1354. 10.1016/j.trpro.2016.05.207. 
Müllner, J. (2017). International project finance: review and implications for 
international finance and international business. Management Review Quarterly, 67 
(2), 97–133. 
Newcomer, H. A., & Adkins, J. W. (1980). Terrorism and the business executive. 
Personnel Journal, 59(11), 913–915. 
O’Rourke, T. D. (2007). Critical infrastructure, interdependencies, and resilience. The 
Bridge, 37(1), 22–29. 
Oetzel, J., & Getz, K. (2012). Why and how might firms respond strategically to violent 
conflict? Journal of International Business Studies, 43(2), 166–186. https://doi.org/ 
10.1057/jibs.2011.50. 
Oh, C. H., & Oetzel, J. (2011). Multinationals’ response to major disasters: How does 
subsidiary investment vary in response to the type of disaster and the quality of 
country governance? Strategic Management Journal, 32(6), 658–681. https://doi.org/ 
10.1002/smj.904. 
Oh, C. H., & Oetzel, J. (2017). Once bitten twice shy? Experience managing violent 
conflict risk and MNC subsidiary-level investment and expansion. Strategic 
Management Journal, 38(3), 714–731. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2498. 
Osborne, J. W. (2015). Best Practices in Logistic Regression. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.  
Powers, M., & Choi, S. W. (2012). Does transnational terrorism reduce foreign direct 
investment? Business-related versus non-business-related terrorism. Journal of Peace 
Research, 49(3), 407–422. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312436768. 
Ramamurti, R. (2003). Can governments make credible promises? Insights from 
infrastructure projects in emerging economies. Journal of International Management, 9 
(3), 253–269. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1075-4253(03)00036-X. 
Ramamurti, R., & Doh, J. P. (2004). Rethinking foreign infrastructure investment in 
developing countries. Journal of World Business, 39(2), 151–167. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.jwb.2003.08.010. 
Rugman, A. M. (1981). Inside the multinationals: The economics of internal markets. New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press.  
Spich, R., & Grosse, R. (2005). How does homeland security affect U.S. Firms’ 
international competitiveness? Journal of International Management, 11(4), 457–478. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intman.2005.09.005. 
Stewart, M. G. (2010). Risk-informed decision support for assessing the costs and benefits 
of counter-terrorism protective measures for infrastructure. International Journal of 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, 3(1), 29–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
ijcip.2009.09.001. 
Stinchcombe, A. L. (1965). Organizations and social structure. In J. G. March (Ed.), 
Handbook of organizations. Chicago: Rand-McNally.  
Studenmund, A. H., & Cassidy, H. J. (1992). Using econometrics: A practical guide. 
Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers.  
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